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La OTAN habla sobre el futuro militar de Catalunya y Escocia.

28 Ago

Es curioso como estudiosos de fuera se dan cuenta que el PIB de Catalunya es como el de Austria.
Y eso es un potencial brutal…
El informe subraya que, en un futuro cercano, Catalunya sería un actor principal en la defensa y estrategia del Mediterráneo…

Catalunya deberá contar, al menos, con una fragata Absolon.
El pedido a los astilleros daneses sería una gran forma de crear alianzas con un país tan moderno como Dinamarca.

The Military Implications of Scottish and Catalonian Secession

Scotland will free-ride in the Atlantic without sustained investment, but Catalonian maritime specialization would be welcome in the Mediterranean.

On 18 September, Scotland votes on the question of independence from the United Kingdom, and the polling strongly suggests a vote of no. On 9 November, Catalonia could be voting on the same issue vis-à-vis Spain, but the polling slightly suggests a yes—if the Spanish Constitutional Court allows the vote to take place. NATO members should treat neither case lightly, but the independence of Catalonia would pose fewer military problems for the alliance than that of Scotland.

The secessionist movements in both countries have endorsed joining both the EU and NATO. But both organizations have warned that accession is not remotely automatic, and depends on the agreement of every existing member state. Those are slightly different lists of 28 countries, and one must only remember the juvenile and endless exclusion of Macedonia by the Greeks—over a branding dispute—to understand how long a blackballing can last. The Spanish probably could not manage to block a determined move for Catalonian self-determination. That said, two of my Atlantic Council colleagues have questioned whether the European Union would admit Catalonia, as some member states (e.g. Belgium) have cause to fear further secessionist activity. Would the British accede to Scottish independence, but then plausibly attempt to exclude the country from NATO? A currency union may be off the table, but such dickering over the serious business of defense would be unacceptable.
As Griffe Witte of the Washington Post argued just this week, in the long run, Scottish secession could be challenging for maintaining Britain’s Trident submarine force. The Scottish National Party (SNP) aims to declare independence in 2016, and see the nukes off by 2020. Today, the submarines and their warheads are conveniently somewhat isolated at Her Majesty’s Naval Base Clyde, 40 kilometers from Glasgow. The Royal Navy’s other two major facilities, HMNB Devonport and HMNB Portsmouth, are both in populated areas on the south coast of England. This has caused some to question whether the south coasters would appreciate the sudden arrival of a few hundred nuclear weapons. But Devonport is where the RN overhauls and refuels those nuclear submarines, so the locals are already accustomed to the presence of things nuclear. In the breach, it is likely that they would prefer the several thousand high-paying industrial jobs that would transfer down from Scotland.
That could be all well and good, but assuming that Scotland and Catalonia were admitted to NATO, what would they contribute? At the Strategic Foresight Forum this past spring at the Atlantic Council, Anne Marie Slaughter—late of Princeton and the US State Department, and now running the New America Foundation—opined that an independent Scotland and an independent Catalonia would do a fine job of defending themselves. At the reception afterwards, a former defense official and defense industrialist argued to me that the consequences for NATO would be adverse, “because the Scots think that defense is a free good”. But even beyond the hyperbole, it’s important to note how significantly plans for forces flying the Saltire cross and the four bars of the Senyera differ.
Scotland is a country of 5.3 million people, with over $200 billion in GDP. The SNP has in mind a tiny version of Britain’s armed forces as a whole: a navy of a few frigates, a fighter squadron, and an armored infantry brigade. With enough investment, a short-ranged maritime patrol squadron might follow as a welcome addition to the recent loss of RAF Coastal Command. The problem, however, is that Scottish resources aren’t likely to match these goals. Spending the NATO average of 1.6% of that GDP on defense would provides just over $3 billion annually. That level of spending is equivalent to the budget of Austria, a neutral country which needn’t maintain a navy. Unless Scotland steps up to a higher rate of spending, its exit from the United Kingdom would produce another free-riding Celtic state on the periphery of the open North Atlantic.
 Catalonia has 7.3 million people, with more than $300 billion in GDP. Spending just 1.6% of that on defense provides over $4.5 billion annually, or roughly the budget of Denmark, which has well-regarded and efficient armed forces. Catalonian military plans are more vague, but so far, they emphasize the navy. With excellent ports in Barcelona and Tarragona, Catalonia is well-positioned as a minor naval power, ‘with the Mediterranean as our strategic environment, and NATO as our framework’, as the nationalists’ think-tank on defense argues. The rough plans call for a littoral security group of a few hundred sailors at first. After a few years, Catalonia would assume responsibility as “a main actor in the Mediterranean,” with land-based maritime patrol aircraft and small surface combatants. Eventually, the nationalist ambition may include an expeditionary group with a light assault carrier and hundreds of marines, to take a serious role in collective security.
 Of course, all these plans are subject to the vagaries of each country’s political process, but even the announced policies differ importantly. Scotland’s tiny replication of British capabilities wouldn’t be so clearly efficient. On the other hand, Catalonia’s ambition would be more restrained. If accurately characterized by the few white papers that have surfaced, the separatists’ position suggests a valuable and refreshing view of specialization in collective defense: build a navy that is comparatively focused on influencing events ashore. By de-emphasizing the military forces that any landlocked country will have, and instead steering investments towards those it is comparatively positioned to provide, Catalonia could punch above its weight in European political affairs. There may be no further Álvaro de Bazáns in Barcelona, but there may be new littoral forces that NATO needs around the periphery of the Mediterranean.
James Hasík is a senior fellow in the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security.

Futuro Ejército Catalán: FUERZA NAVAL.

1 Jul


La sectorial de Defensa de la ANC ha difundido un nuevo documento “orientativo” de cómo debería ser una virtual Fuerza Naval de Catalunya. Una fuerza que debería contar con unos 2.000 efectivos humanos entre oficiales y marinería una vez completadas todas las fases.

Según este planteamiento, las fuerzas armadas catalanas deberían tener una Academia Naval de Catalunya. En primer término, el documento apunta que se debería crear una “primera unidad operativa” con un “Comando de patrulla litoral”, con seis patrulleras, seis embarcaciones no tripuladas y seis drones así como un remolcador de altura.

Por otra parte, la Fuerza Naval de Catalunya también contaría con un Centro de Mando y Control que garantizaría la “unidad de acción” de todos los elementos y efectivos. Esta fase se alargaría durante 10 años. Esta fuerza controlaría las aguas territoriales y el EEX (Exclusive Economic Zone).

Una vez aseguradas las aguas territoriales, el estudio prevé participar con la OTAN del marco estratégico de la defensa del Mediterráneo a través del Standing NATO Maritime Group 2. Para participar, el ANC calcula que deberían articular un Mando de escolta con funciones de guerra antisubmarina, de superficies y aérea que contaría con un máximo de 4 corbetas polivalentes. En este punto la Fuerza Naval catalana debería tener en sus filas 1.700 efectivos.

Posteriormente se pondría en marcha el Cuartel de Operaciones Navales, con un Estado Mayor y con participación en convenios internacionales de Defensa y Seguridad. Una vez centrada la Fuerza en el Mediterráneo, el ANC no descartaría “proyectar una fuerza internacional para la contribución de la paz” en el Índico y el Atlántico dirigida por un Mando Expedicionario. La Sectorial recomienda aplicar el concepto Multirole Derramas, la polivalencia en las naves, con fragatas como la Absalon de la Marina Real Danesa, muy funcionales y especialmente adaptables a los puertos catalanes.

¿El Absalon danés futura fragata multiusos catalana?
Con el dinero de 4 años de expolio del puerto de Barcelona se pagaría…